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I. 
There is nothing intrinsically fallacious about qualifying the standpoint by means 
of a stance adverb (contra Jason, G. (1988). Hedging as a fallacy of language. 
Informal Logic, 10, 169-175). 
II. 
The concept of the burden of proof is necessary to explain the protagonist’s 
strategic goal when qualifying the standpoint. 
III. 
The weight of the burden of proof for a standpoint should be measured with regard 
to the questions that the other party asks, and not with regard to the content of the 
standpoint. 
IV. 
There is no such thing as modification of illocutionary force (contra Holmes, J. 
(1984). Modifying illocutionary force. Journal of Pragmatics, 8, 345-365). 
V. 
Analysing presumption as a speech act misses the point about what presumptions 
are and how they function in argumentative discourse (contra Walton, D.N. (1993). 
The speech act of presumption. Pragmatics and Cognition, 1, 125-148). 
VI. 
Corpus analytic tools are needed in the study of argumentative markers to provide 
an account that is not only theoretically grounded but also empirically plausible. 
VII. 
The practice of analysing oratory texts of the past as good examples of rhetoric 
blurs the boundaries between philology and argumentation studies. 
VIII. 
The fact that what is persuasive in actual communication is sometimes anything but 
rational does not mean that rational models of argumentation lack descriptive 
adequacy. 
IX. 
Synchronic dictionaries do not necessarily describe what language actually is. 
X. 
The habit of Dutch doctors of arguing about their patients’ health problems with 
them is more worrying than comforting for the patient. 
